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ABSTRACT 
 
Social Identity and Cooperation. (April 2010) 
 
Bianca Nicole Manago  
Department of Sociology 
Texas A&M University 
 
Research Advisor: Jane Sell 
Department of Sociology 
 
This study seeks to examine the effects of cooperation on social identity in group work.  
I posit that members of groups which are cooperative and therefore successful will be 
more likely to identify with the group, than members of those groups which are not 
cooperative.  To test the prediction, I conduct an experimental test in which groups of 
four work on a public goods task.  While groups‘ cooperative behavior is not related to 
social identity, individuals‘ perceptions of others’ cooperation is significantly related to 
social identity. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Social dilemmas are situations in which individual interests and collective interests are 
opposed, at least in the short run.  In social dilemmas, individuals must decide whether to 
cooperate or to defect. Rational choice theories suggest that, other things being equal, most 
individuals will defect when presented with a choice. However, there is clear evidence that 
some factors can change individuals‘ choice.  There is overwhelming evidence that social 
identity increases cooperation in social dilemmas.  The processes which are credited for 
contributing to this phenomenon include; (1) the idea that individuals no longer distinguish 
between the group‘s goals and their own, and (2) that fear is decreased because actors 
expect the group members to act as they will. 
 
This research seeks to examine the reverse process.  That is, can cooperation in social 
dilemmas lead to group identity? When placed in a social dilemma, if the group proves to 
be cooperative, do individuals more strongly identify with successful or cooperative 
groups and not with unsuccessful groups?  I posit that in those groups which are 
cooperative, fear is decreased thereby allowing common fate and social identity processes 
to take place. 
 
Social dilemmas 
Social dilemmas are commonly found in society.  A social dilemma is a conflict between 
individual prosperity in the short run and the prosperity of the group (Dawes 1980).  Social  
_________________ 
This thesis follows the style of the American Sociological Review. 
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dilemmas are often categorized as public goods or resource goods.  In resource goods, the 
individual can decide to either consume or abstain from consuming a limited resource (Sell 
and Son, Y. 1997).    To illustrate, one example of this would be the limited water supply 
which is confronting the world. To utilize water supplies in reservoirs in the future we 
must be frugal and refrain from depleting these sources now.  If we are not however, there 
will be no potable water left for future generations.  Public goods dilemmas are those in 
which an individual has the option of consuming without contributing (Sell and Son, Y. 
1997).  One example of a public goods dilemma would be supporting clean air in the 
environment.  Individuals can still benefit from clean air while they practice habits which 
contribute to air pollution.  Moreover, those who take public-transportation, walk, or ride 
bikes are contributing to clean air, yet still suffer the consequences of those who are not. In 
both forms of these social dilemmas, resource goods and public goods, individuals have 
one of two choices, to cooperate or to defect (De Cremer et al. 2008). For an individual to 
demonstrate cooperative behavior in the above examples one would limit their water usage 
and take green transportation.  However, because of the incentive structure, people will be 
tempted to defect or free ride to benefit their own self-interests (Luce and Raiffa 1957). 
Defection in the aforementioned examples would be exemplified by someone who does 
not conserve water or protect the air.  As one can see, without an appropriate incentive 
structure to gear the individual‘s behavior towards that of the collective, the problem of 
defection will not solve itself. Since this type of situation proves to be common in society, 
social scientists are interested in answering the question; how can we encourage 
individuals to act on the behalf of the group when at least in the short term, they do not 
benefit from the cooperation?   
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To answer this question, researchers have been examining the causes for defection for 
several years.  The two most prominent reasons for defection suggested by researchers are 
fear and greed (Smith, E. Jackson, J., and Sparks, C. 2003).  Fear for the actor, stems from 
the idea that their cooperation in the group will be taken advantage of (Kerr 1989).   The 
other reason for defection, greed, occurs because people tend to act to benefit self interest 
(De Cremer 2008).   Free riding is a form of defection associated with either fear or greed. 
The free rider problem is associated with a person who does not contribute to the group, 
but still benefits.  Since this problem is so common in society many theories exist on the 
topic of how to stop the free rider problem.  However, most researchers would agree that 
one of the most important factors for increasing the likelihood of cooperation is increased 
social identity among group members (Brewer and Kramer 1986; Ostrom 1998; Simpson 
2006; Sell and Love 2009). 
 
Social identity  
The two theoretical perspectives which address the process of the formation of identity are 
identity theory (also known as identity control theory), and social identity theory.  Identity 
theory focuses on these processes as in how they related to the individual where as social 
identity looks at these on the social and group stage (Stets and Burke 2000).  Essentially, 
personal identity focuses on the differences between an individual and others, and social 
identity focuses on the likeness of a person to a particular in-group, and the differences 
with various out-groups (Reid A and Deaux 1996).  Social identity is associated with 
membership in a social group and includes a cognitive, evaluative and emotional element 
of that membership (Tajfel 1981; Sell and Love 2009). Many hold the view that to create a 
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group in which to form social identity, an out group must exist in which to contrast one‘s 
own group membership.  However, Brewer (1979) concluded that increased bias was more 
related to in-group identification than out-group hostility.  Therefore, Brewer‘s conclusion 
notes the importance of social identification in increasing cooperation without the 
necessity of an out group (1979).  
 
However, as Stets and Burke (2000) suggest, identity and social identity are closely linked 
as well.  They suggest that the processes which are occurring on the social level are 
inseparable from those which are happening on the personal level.  For example, within the 
perspective of social identity when one categorizes themselves with a group it is known as 
‗self categorization‘, when this same process occurs in identity theory it referred to as 
‗identification‘ (Stets and Burke 2000).    Each includes the process of drawing 
comparisons between self and others.  However, when those comparisons are also drawn 
by others this creates a group, or social network.  Over time, the individual creates many of 
these social identities or categories which make up their personal identity (Stets and Burke 
2000).  From these social groups, and subsequent internalized identities, there is a set of 
behavior which is expected and correlates with each group (Roccas and Brewer 2002).  For 
example, as a sport‘s team fan it is expected that you know the players on the team, the 
game schedule, the cheers and yells, and some of the history.  You would go to the games 
and represent the team colors through what you are wearing.  The identities that one may 
accumulate or realize overtime may overlap and even conflict (Roccas and Brewer 2002).  
This conflict can be exemplified in a social dilemma.  One may identify with the group, 
and also identify with self interest, making decisions to cooperate more difficult on the 
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individual.  
 
Although, most researches would agree that social identity plays a major role in increasing 
cooperation in social dilemmas, there are several different ideas as to how social identity 
effects cooperation.   
 
Social identity and cooperation 
The traditional explanation as to why increased social identity increases cooperation, 
suggests that social identity increases cooperation by reducing participants‘ tendency to 
draw distinctions between their own welfare and the welfare of others.  This is supposed to 
eliminate greed which is a common cause of defection.  This theory suggests that with an 
increase in social identity, there is an increase in the mindset that ‗the shared and mutual 
perception by in-group members of their interests as interchangeable‘ (Turner et al 1985).  
In other words, due to increased social identity between group members, the self interest 
becomes the same as the group interest. Once the interests are interchangeable, group 
members are likely to be more cooperative because they are not distinguishing their 
interests from those of the group.   
 
However, there are alternative explanations as to how social identity effects cooperation.  
Yamagishi and Kiyonari suggest that increased social identity creates expectations among 
members of the in-group (Yamagishi, T and Kiyonari, T 2000). Thus, as social identity 
increases for group members, they will anticipate increased cooperation from other group 
members.  Furthermore, as the group members recognize these expectations of others, they 
6 
 
 
will internalize them and act accordingly.  Therefore, those who are members of the in-
group fear the result of not acting according to these expectations and do so because of the 
social pressure which is added when one identifies with a group (Yamagishi, T and 
Kiyonari, T 2000).    
 
Brewer suggests that social identity is increased by diminishing the perceived differences 
which exist between group members (Brewer 2000).   Furthermore, by maximizing 
differences of the out group, social identity is shown to increase even more, therefore 
increasing cooperation in group settings.  Simpson‘s studies supported this concept by 
demonstrating that minimizing the differences between group members decreases fear of 
the betrayal of others.  However, in Simpson‘s studies these techniques did not seem to be 
successful at decreasing personal greed (Simpson 2006).   
 
One of the more popular theories when discussing the method of how social identity is 
created is the idea of common fate. 
 
Common fate 
Common fate is often shared among group members if the outcome of a certain situation is 
dependent upon the other members of the group.  If the success or failure of a group is 
dependent upon all of the members cooperation, the group members are said to share 
common fate (Sell and Love 2009).  Brewer and Kramer (1986) argue that if group 
members feel that they have a common fate, social or group identity should be increased 
between the group members.  Members of a defined group will feel as though part of their 
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outcome is determined by their membership with the group.  For example, if we are all 
Americans there are certain outcomes which we would expect to be common to all of the 
members in this group.  Brewer seems to suggest that the need for security associated with 
common fate is the main contributing factor to social identity (Caporael and Brewer 1995).  
However, Brewer (2000) also notes that the sense of need for security emphasizes the issue 
of trust, which can contribute to the disassociation with an out-group.  In summary, 
common fate often increases social identity however this is not always the case. 
 
Hypotheses 
Social dilemmas have the ability to create a sense of common fate because there is a shared 
sense of how outcomes are tied to group membership. As described above, this sense of 
common fate has the potential to create increased social identity between group members.  
Moreover, if the group is seen to be cooperative, group members will have positive 
feelings towards the group and be more likely to identify with the group.  If the group ends 
up favorably performing to the desired outcome of its members, the common fate of that 
group will be considered to be good.  Therefore, when group members look back and 
analyze the cooperative behavior of the group members, the members will want to 
associate with this behavior which is looked at as positive.  Much of what inhibits 
cooperative behavior in social dilemmas is a fear of betrayal, and social identity is said to 
lessen this fear.  Therefore, I posit that if the fear of betrayal is eliminated, the inability for 
group members to form social identity should also be diminished.  On the same note, I 
suggest that if the group member no longer feels insecure, and the group turned out to be 
trustworthy, common fate is increased which in turn increases social identity.  
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However, if the group does not cooperate, and the group is not successful, group members 
will be less likely to want to associate with this behavior.   A lack of success in the group 
will only highlight the issues of trust and insecurity which are shown to decrease one‘s 
ability to form social identity.  Therefore, members will not adopt uncooperative behavior 
into the image of their own identity but rather associate the deviant behavior as 
characteristic of the out-group.   
 
(H1) If a participant is a member of a group that has shown to be cooperative during a 
social dilemma this participant will have increased social identity with the group.  The 
group members will be more likely to want to associate with the positive behavior.   In 
reverse, it is posited that group members will associate an unsuccessful turnout, on the 
group as a whole and will not want to associate with uncooperative behavior or less 
success.   [H2] If a participant is a member of a group that has shown to be uncooperative 
during a social dilemma this participant will have not have increased social identity with 
the group.  We also look to examine if group members are simply identifying with the 
attribute cooperation, or if they are identifying with the group as a whole.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
METHODS 
Recruiting  
Participants consisted of undergraduate students who were recruited from classes at Texas 
A&M University. (See Appendix A for a copy of the recruitment form) As an incentive, 
students were offered the opportunity to earn money to participate in any one of many 
studies which happen at the university.   Students who were interested in participating were 
then asked to fill out an information sheet which asked for their name, number, 
classification, age, gender, and schedule.  The students were also asked for a list of studies 
which they had participated in prior to ensure they had not already participated in a similar 
study. Students were scheduled by phone. (for the telephone recruiting script, see 
Appendix B) 
 
Settings and procedures 
Upon arriving in the lab, participants were met by a researcher who asked them to read 
over an informed consent sheet which explained the procedures.  The informed consent 
sheet informed participants that they can leave the study at any time and still receive 
compensation for their participation (See Appendix C for the IRB approval; see Appendix 
D for the informed consent).  Participants were informed that they would receive 
compensation in private immediately after the study. 
 
After all of the participants arrived, they were seated in a room with 8 individuals and told 
that they would be working together in groups of 4 to earn money.  However, to control for 
anonymity, participants were not informed which 4 of the 8 people in the room would be in 
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their group. Additionally, the researchers ensured that there were not groups that consisted 
of only one sex.  This controls for participants being able to conclude that there group was 
either all men or all women.  (We know this to be an important aspect of public goods 
studies based on prior research.  See Sell et al, 1993 and Sell 1997)  
 
To record each participant‘s decision and to inform the participant of his or her earnings, 
participants used an iPod Touch which had an application designed for our experiment. 
The study and the different types of investments were thoroughly explained to the 
participants.  Participants were then given a worksheet to ensure they understood the 
procedures and the funds.  After the researcher explained the worksheet, participants went 
through three trial runs of the study using the iPod Touches to ensure comfort with the 
process and technology.  The experiment did not proceed until all participants were 
comfortable with all aspects of the study. 
 
Experimental design   
The entire experiment was composed of two conditions, a crisis condition in which 
participants initially thought that they were in an individual study, and a control condition 
in which participants always understood that they were in a group study.  For the purposes 
of this study, I am analyzing only those participants in the control condition.  There were 
22 groups of 4 members each in the control condition.  
 
Participants could decide whether they wanted to contribute to the group fund or keep their 
money in the individual fund.  Each round, 100 tokens were placed in each participant‘s 
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private fund.  Each of the tokens in the individual fund is worth one cent in United States 
currency.  Tokens contributed to the group fund were worth three cents, but were then 
divided equally among all four of the group members. This process ensured that the money 
in the group fund was truly a public good.  Each round, participants were given the 
opportunity to contribute tokens to the group fund (cooperate), or to keep tokens for them 
self (defect).  Participants did not have the option to take tokens from the group fund for 
their individual fund.   
 
At the beginning of each decision period, participants were given the following 
instructions (See Appendix E for copy of instructions): 
At the beginning of each decision period 100 tokens will be 
placed in your private fund. You have two choices as to what 
you can do with these tokens.   
 
The first option is to contribute tokens into the group fund. 
Each token contributed to the group fund is worth three 
cents, and each token invested in the group fund is divided 
equally among the members of the group – no matter how 
much they contribute to the group.   In summary, regardless 
of your contributions as an individual, you always receive ¼ 
of the group fund.  
 
The second option is to keep your tokens in the private fund.  
Each token added to the private fund is worth one cent.  It is 
added to your earnings and is not shared with the other group 
members. 
 
 
During the study, a record sheet was given to participants so that each participant could 
record his or her decisions (See Appendix F for the record sheet).   Furthermore, the iPod 
Touch also kept a record of the decisions and total earnings so that participants could 
12 
 
 
check their work.  Participants were able to see the total amount in the group fund, but not 
what the individual members of their group contributed. 
 
Dependent variable    
The dependent variable, social identity, was measured by participants‘ response to a series 
of 7 questions concerning the study (See Appendix G for questionnaire).  For example, 
question 4a asks; ―How important is belonging to this group?‖  For each statement, 
participants were asked to indicate their response on a Likert scale which ranged from -5 to 
5.  These questions were used to measure the participant‘s social identity with group 
members. 
 
Independent variables 
Two independent variables were used in this study of social identity: cooperation behavior 
and perception of group cooperation. The cooperation of the group was measured by the 
number of tokens contributed to the group fund by the group members, not including the 
participant.  Thus, each group member had a unique value for cooperation of other group 
members. In addition, the participants were asked four questions which measured the 
participant‘s perception of the cooperation of their group members.  These four questions 
formed an index of perception of group cooperation.  Each of these independent variables 
was used to predict social identity using a regression equation.  
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Post experimental procedures 
Upon completion of the study, participants were asked to write down their final earnings 
on the record sheet, and to make sure that this number corresponded with the amount on 
the iPod touches.  Participants were then asked to fill out a questionnaire regarding the 
study which they just participated in. After responding to the questionnaire, each 
participant was randomly called separately out of the room, and paid based on their 
earnings. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
RESULTS 
 
I first assess the measurement of the dependent variable, social identity. Cronbach‘s alpha, 
a measure of internal consistency is x.  This indicates a high level of consistency for the 
items and suggests I can use it as an index. 
 
Contributions 
All groups completed four trials in the public goods task.  For each individual participant, a 
maximum of 1200 tokens could have been entered into the group fund by his or her group 
members throughout the four rounds that each group had in common.   
 
Perception of group behavior 
Participants were asked to analyze their group behavior using four questions in Likert 
format.  Those groups perceived as being most cooperative could have received a score up 
to 44 from the participant, and those seen as being the least cooperative received a score of 
4. The internal reliability of the index questions to measure the participant‘s interpretation 
of the group behavior was acceptable at .906.  
 
Table 1 depicts the results for the regression testing the relationship between contributions 
and social identity (page 41).  As indicated, the model is not significant at the traditional 
.05 level.   However, the next model in which perceptions of group cooperation is added is 
significant.   Therefore, increased social identity was not dependent on the number of 
token‘s group members donated, but only on whether the participants perceived this 
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behavior as cooperative. The statistical significance of .0001 indicates that there is little 
chance of making a type 1 error.  Additionally, these results suggest that approximately 
26% of one‘s likeliness to identify with the group is determined by how they rank their 
group‘s behavior.   Therefore, our study found that as the participant‘s perception of 
cooperation increases, the participant amount of social identity the participant has with the 
group members, excluding his or herself, also increases.   
 
Table 1 
Models of the effect of cooperation of the group and perceived cooperation of the group on 
social identity 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Cooperation of others in 
group 
Beta                        .116 
SE                            .008 
B                              .009 
Beta                        .023   
SE                            .002 
B                              .002 
Perception  Beta                        .971*   
SE                            .031 
B                              1.218 
 R
2                              .013 
Df                             86 
 
R2                              .948 
Df                             85 
 
*Significant at the .01 level 
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CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study examined how cooperative behavior and perceptions of cooperative behavior 
affect group members‘ social identity.  I found that perceptions of cooperative behavior, 
but not necessarily the cooperative behavior itself significantly predicted social identity. 
 
Although the actions of the group members may have been more cooperative, the 
participants may not have interpreted this behavior as so.  Therefore, the participants did 
not associate with these group members.  However, if the participant recognized the 
behavior of the group members as being cooperative, then the participant did have higher 
social identity with the group members.  
 
This finding is interesting from many differing perspectives.  One of the most important 
concepts in social psychology is the social construction of reality: the idea that perception 
shapes the way in which actors interact and therefore the consequences.  My finding 
illustrates that while behavior may be important the perception of the behavior is most 
critical for social identity. 
 
Mead (1934) also discusses the concept of perception in terms of the interpretation of a 
gesture being an action which elicits a response.  To relate this to the above study, the 
gestures that were being produced by the group members were not significant to the 
participant because they didn‘t fully understand the social context.  It is my assumption 
that although the participants understood the investments, they did not have a means for 
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social comparison.  Therefore, it was difficult for them to assess the cooperation of their 
group members.  Festinger (1954) discusses the importance of this social comparison in 
making self evaluations, as well as evaluating others.  The gesture of contributing may not 
have been seen as a significant symbol because there was not a generalized social context 
in which to assess the contributions of group members.   
 
In the future, researchers might add information about social context so that participants 
might assess their group more fully.  Additionally, research might explore participants‘ 
assessments of their own behavior, specially, their own cooperation. For example, it may 
be important to investigate how participants see themselves relative to the others in the 
group.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
RECRUITMENT SCRIPT IN CLASS 
 
My name is _________ and I am here to tell you about some studies that we are 
conducting in the Department of Sociology and to invite you to volunteer to participate in 
these studies.  You will have the opportunity to see how sociologists conduct research, and 
to be paid for your participation. I can not tell you exactly what study you might be in or 
exactly what you will be paid because we are recruiting for several different studies right 
now.  But I can tell you that some of our studies pay up to $20.00 for as little as one hour 
of your time. Other studies are short questionnaire studies that may take only half an hour 
and those usually pay around 7-10 dollars. 
 
In a minute, I will hand out these sign up sheets [HOLD SIGN UP SHEET SO CLASS 
CAN SEE IT], which ask for your name, telephone number and the times most convenient 
for you to participate. If you decide to sign up, we will call you sometime in the next few 
weeks to schedule a time.  We can give you information about the specific study, pay and 
time, location, etc, when we call to schedule you.  At that time, you can agree to participate 
or to be removed from our pool.  You will notice that we also ask some other questions 
about your experiences, for example, if you have any certifications that involve emergency 
actions (such as EMT or Paramedic training).  This is because we are doing a series of 
studies that involve asking people to remember certain emergency events they have been 
trained to deal with. 
 
Now, you may have heard stories about experiments that actually caused people to have 
negative experiences.  There is a famous study, for example – the Milgrom study – in 
which people thought they were sending electric shocks to other people and hurting them.  
They were not really, but they thought they were. Today, that experiment is considered to 
have ethical problems because people suffered psychological trauma just from being in the 
study. I want to assure you that nothing like this is going on in our studies. Partly because 
of problems in past experiments, new federal guidelines were developed for all studies that 
use human subjects.  Here at A&M, all our studies go through the human subjects review 
board (called the IRB).  Importantly, if you should ever feel uncomfortable while in ANY 
study, you should just leave. 
 
Another thing I want to make sure you understand is that you are not obligated in any way 
to sign up.  You participation has nothing to do with this class. Dr. (Fill in professor‘s 
name) won‘t know if you come or if you  don‘t come.  There is no extra credit for 
participation.  So, just because I show up here in your class, don‘t feel obligated to sign up.  
If you are interested and would like to participate, please fill out the form and pass it in to 
me.  If you are not interested, simply hand the form back. 
 
I appreciate your help. 
 
Are there any questions? 
[Hand out sign-up sheets.] 
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APPENDIX B 
 
TELEPHONE SCRIPT FOR SCHEDULING 
 
Hello.  This is __________________, and I am calling from the Social Psychology Lab  at 
Texas A&M University. May I please speak to ________________________________?   
 
[if speaker is not __________________________, wait for 
________________________________, then re-identify self as above. If __________ is 
not available, ask when would be a good time to call back. If information is not available, 
than answerer and say good bye. On contact info sheet, write time/date of call, and that 
roommate answered. If time to call back was available write that too.] 
 
Earlier in the semester, in one of your classes, (OR earlier today, last week, yesterday, as 
appropriate) you were invited to participate our paid research studies and you indicated 
that you were interested in participating. I am calling to now to follow up on that. 
 
Let me verify, are you an undergraduate student at Texas A&M? 
 
(If yes) Great. 
 
Let me quickly tell you about this study: It takes place on campus, in the Academic 
Building, and lasts about (put time in here). You can expect to earn from (put in Amount 
here). You will be asked to work on (put relevant information here about the study). The 
research asks no questions that are sensitive or personal. You participation is completely 
voluntary. If you do volunteer, you may refuse to answer any individual question and you 
have the right to withdraw your participation at any time.  
 
[Note: use information from sign up sheet regarding convenient time for subject]  
 
Would you be able to make it at ________________(time) on _____________(day)? 
 
[If YES: go to confirmation; if NO . . .] 
 
How about ________________(time) on _____________(day)? 
 
[If YES: go to confirmation; if NO . . .] 
 
Could you make it at ___________________ on ___________________? 
 
[If YES: go to confirmation; if NO, continue reading next each available time, in 
order, until you find one that subject can make] 
 
Confirmation: Great!  Why don‘t you get a pencil while I put you on our schedule? 
 
[When subject has pencil and paper] 
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You have been scheduled to participate in a study that takes place at ____________ on 
________________.  The study will take place in room 305 of the Academic Building.  
That‘s on the third floor.   
 
Do you know where that is?   
 
[If not, Directions: Academic Building is the one with the big dome, behind Evans 
Library.  If you go to the Ross statute, you‘ll see the dome on the building right 
behind it.  We are on the third floor. There will be signs posted leading to 305. 
 
Thank you again for agreeing to participate.  I, or someone else from the lab will call you 
the day before your scheduled time to leave a reminder. 
 
We‘ll see you at __________ on ___________. 
 
Thank you. 
 
[Make sure to place the participant‘s first name only and phone number in the Google 
calendar. Once two persons are scheduled for a given time, not that in the title of the time 
block so it is visible without opening the time block. Remove the contact info sheet from 
the active pool] 
 
Individual or Experimental:  You will simply be answering some questions and will be 
paid according to your responses.  This can take different amounts of time, but people do 
not usually take over an hour.  The pay varies from about 5 to about 25 for that amount of 
time. 
 
Control:  you will be working with a group of people.  You pay depends on what you and 
other group members do.  This can take different amounts of time, but the study does not 
usually take more than an hour.  The pay varies from about 5 to 25 dollars for that amount 
of time. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
IRB APPROVAL 
 
TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY 
DIVISION OF RESEARCH AND GRADUATE STUDIES - OFFICE OF RESEARCH COMPLIANCE 
1186 TAMU, General Services Complex  
College Station, TX 77843-1186  
750 Agronomy Road, #3500 
979.458.1467 
FAX 979.862.3176  
http://researchcompliance.tamu.edu 
 
Human Subjects Protection Program   Institutional Review Board 
 
 
DATE: 05-Feb-2010 
     MEMORANDUM 
TO: SELL, JANE 
FROM: Office of Research 
Compliance 
 
Institutional Review 
Board 
SUBJECT: Initial Review 
 
Protocol 
Number: 2010-0059 
Title: Public Goods and Change of Expectations 
Review 
Category: Expedited 
Approval 
Period: 05-Feb-2010 To 04-Feb-2011 
 
Approval determination was based on the following Code of Federal 
Regulations: 
 
45 CFR 46.110(b)(1) - Some or all of the research appearing on the list and found by 
the reviewer(s) to involve no more than minimal risk. 
------------ 
(7) Research on individual or group characteristics or behavior (including, but not 
limited to, research on perception, cognition, motivation, identity, language, 
communication, cultural beliefs or practices, and social behavior) or research 
employing survey, interview, oral history, focus group, program evaluation, human 
factors evaluation or quality assurance methodologies. 
 
(Note: Some research in this category may be exempt from the HHS regulations for 
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the protection of human subjects. 45 CFR 46.101(b)(2) and (b) (3). This listing refers 
only to research that is not exempt.)  
 
Provisions:  
 
 
This research project has been approved for one (1) year. As principal investigator, 
you assume the following responsibilities 
1. Continuing Review: The protocol must be renewed each year in order 
to continue with the research project. A Continuing Review along with 
required documents must be submitted 30 days before the end of the 
approval period. Failure to do so may result in processing delays and/or 
non-renewal. 
2. Completion Report: Upon completion of the research project 
(including data analysis and final written papers), a Completion Report 
must be submitted to the IRB Office. 
3. Adverse Events: Adverse events must be reported to the IRB Office 
immediately. 
4. Amendments: Changes to the protocol must be requested by 
submitting an Amendment to the IRB Office for review. The Amendment 
must be approved by the IRB before being implemented. 
5. Informed Consent: Information must be presented to enable persons 
to voluntarily decide whether or not to participate in the research 
project. 
This electronic document provides notification of the review results by the Institutional Review Board. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
Social dilemma study 
 
You have been asked to participate in a study concerning the ways in which people solve problems.  
You were selected to be a possible participant because you volunteered your contact information 
when one of our researchers spoke to your class earlier this semester.  The study will involve 
approximately 660 people and will be conducted in rooms located in the Academic Building.    The 
purpose of this study is to examine how people make decisions in group settings. 
 
If you agree to be in this study, you will be asked to work with 3 other people to make decisions.  
We will also be asking you to fill out some questionnaires concerning the study.  Other than the 
financial compensation, there are no direct risks or benefits to being a participant in this study. You 
do not have to answer any questions that make you feel uncomfortable. 
 
There is variation in how long this study will take.   Most studies take from forty minutes to an 
hour and a half.  Your earnings depend upon how you and your group members make decisions.  
Therefore, your pay can vary from about 5 dollars to about 25 dollars.  If you are uncomfortable 
during the study you may stop at any time.  If you stop, you will earn the amount up to the time 
you stop. 
  
This study is confidential.  Although your first name will be used on decision recording sheet, no 
identifiers linking you to the study will be included in any sort of report that might be published.  
Only the researchers associated with this study will have access to your written records.   
 
This study is not associated with any class at Texas A&M University. There will be no class credit 
involved, and your participation in this study will not affect your grades now or in any future 
classes at Texas A&M University.  
  
This research study has been reviewed by the Human Subjects‘ Protection Program and/or the 
Institutional Review Board at Texas A&M University.  For research-related problems or questions 
regarding your rights as a research participant, you can contact these offices at (979)458-4067 or 
irb@tamu.edu. 
  
Please be sure you have read the above information, asked questions and received answers to your 
satisfaction.  You will be given a copy of the consent form for your records.  By signing this 
document, you consent to participate in this study. 
 
 
__________________________________   __________________ 
Signature of Subject      Date 
 
 
__________________________________ 
Signature of Researcher 
If you have any further questions, feel free to contact Dr. Jane Sell, Sociology Department, TAMU, 
845-6120. 
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APPENDIX E 
 
SCRIPT 
 
The study in which you will participate concerns how people in groups make decisions. 
You are one member of a group of four people. Everyone in the group will be making the 
same kinds of decisions. The people in your group may be in this room or they may be in 
another room. You will not be able to speak to the other members of your group. This is 
because we are interested in how people interact in environments in which they cannot see 
each other or interact face-to-face.  
 
Each member will make a number of decisions and record them on the green sheets we 
gave you when you came in. At the end of the study you will be paid, in private, the 
amount that you have earned throughout these trials.  
 
The decisions that you will be making concern what to do with 100 tokens that will be put 
into a PRIVATE FUND for every decision.  
 
You will be working with the same group members for all of the decisions in this study.  
At the beginning of each decision period, 100 tokens are put into your private fund.  Then, 
you have 2 choices about what to do with the tokens in your private fund.  
 
The first choice involves INVESTING tokens in the group fund. Each token invested in the 
group fund is worth 3 cents and each token in this fund is evenly divided among all 
members of the group—no matter how much they invest in the group fund. That is, 
regardless of what you do as an individual, you always receive ¼ share of the group fund.  
 
The second choice involves KEEPING tokens in the private fund. Every token put in your 
private fund is worth 1 cent. This is added directly to your earnings—it is not shared with 
other group members.  
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For every decision period, you may invest up to 100 tokens in the group fund or  keep up 
to 100 tokens in your private fund.  
 
Let’s go through some examples so that it is clear how you make a decision and the 
outcomes of the decision are determined.  
 
As an example, suppose during one decision you invest no tokens in the group fund and 
instead keep all 100 tokens in your private fund. (On your record sheet, you would show 
your decision by putting 0 in the column marked ‗# Tokens I have in the Group Fund.‘).  
On the iPod touch you would enter 0 when asked how much you wish to contribute to the 
group fund.  
 
So, after you have made each decision, you will enter your decision on the iPod touch.  
After you enter your decision, a computer spread sheet will generate the results and send 
them back to you.  When the results are sent back, please copy down your results on the 
record sheet in front of you. Based on all the decisions by the people in your group, you 
will find out how many tokens are in which funds, and consequently what everyone will 
earn.  
 
Continuing with this example.  Suppose the other 3 group members invest a total of 240 
tokens in the group fund and you kept all 100 tokens in your private fund.  
How much would you earn?  
 
To figure this out, you take the 100 tokens you kept in the private fund and multiply that 
by 1 cent. This equals $1.00. Then we take the 240 tokens in the group fund and multiply 
that by 3 cents. This equals $7.20 or 720.  
Since all group members receive an equal share of this, every member‘s share is 720/4 or 
180. So, for this decision, you would earn $1.00 + $1.80 = $2.80.  
 
Shown again in a format that is broken down: 
Private Fund Earnings:  100 x 1=100 or $1.00 
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Group Fund Earnings:   240 x 3= 720 or $7.20/4 =$1.80 
Total Earnings for this period: Private Fund Earnings + Group Fund Earnings  
             $1.00 + $1.80 = $2.80 
 
As a second example, suppose during one decision you invest all 100 of your tokens in the 
group fund. (You would show this decision by writing 0 in the ‘# tokens I have in the 
Private Fund’ indicating 0. Then you would mark 100 in the ‘# tokens I have in the 
Group Fund’ column.)  
 
Now, suppose that the other group members invest another 60 tokens to the group fund. 
Thus the group fund equals 160 tokens. The 160 tokens in the group fund are multiplied by 
3 cents to equal $4.80 or 480 cents. Since all group members receive an equal share of this, 
your share is 480/4, which equals 120 or $1.20. So, for this decision you earn $0 (from 
your private fund) and $1.20 in the group fund which equals $1.20.  
 
Shown again in a format that is broken down: 
Private Fund Earnings:  0 x 1= 0 or $0.00 
Group Fund Earnings:   160 x 3= 480 or $4.80/4 =$1.20 
Total Earnings for this period: Private Fund Earnings + Group Fund Earnings  
             $0.00 + $1.20 = $1.20 
 
Please pull out your green sheet.  The first column labeled ‗# of tokens I have in the private 
fund‘ is how much you are choosing to keep in your private fund – this will be multiplied 
by 1 cent and is yours only.  The column labeled ‗# of tokens I have in the group fund‘ is 
the amount that you are choosing to invest in the group fund – this will be multiplied by 3 
cents and divided among all of the group members.  
 The column labeled ―My total earnings for this period‖ is the combination of the private 
fund, and your portion of the group fund.  Finally, the column labeled ―Total‖ allows you 
to keep a running tally of how much you have earned by adding your total earnings from 
each period together.  
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Just to make sure that you understand the two types of investments, please work through 
the examples on the yellow piece of paper on your desk. When you are finished, please 
place your pen and calculator down. If you have any questions, a researcher will be happy 
to help you.  We will go through all of the problems together when everyone has finished. 
 
Let‘s go through the yellow sheet together – 
 
EXAMPLE RUN THROUGH 
 
Now how and what will happen in every decision period? 
 
For all trials, you will mark on your green sheet whether you wish to invest any of your 
tokens in your private fund to the group fund. You will then ALSO enter in your decision 
in the iPod touch. 
 
After all group members have entered their decision, you will be able to see the sum of all 
members‘ investment in the group fund, your individual earnings for each trial and your 
total earnings for the trial. For each round please copy the information down from the iPod 
Touch so that we have two copies of the amount earned.  The iPod Touch will tell you how 
much you have earned each period in your group fund, private fund, and your total 
earnings for the period. You will be responsible for adding each of your total earnings per 
period together using the calculators.   
So, after each period, you will enter your decision on the iPod touch, then after all group 
members have entered their decision, you will be given information about your earnings 
for each trial. 
 
Here are the instructions for using the iPod Touch: 
Please DO NOT TOUCH the iPod Touch until we ask you to.    
 
To begin we will have you touch on the TAMU icon.  It will then ask you for your 
participant number.  This number was written by a researcher and is on your green sheet 
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labeled Participant #. Then you will wait.  DO NOT press ―click to begin‖ until we say we 
will be starting the round. 
 
Once we announce the beginning of the period, you may click to begin. 
This screen as seen on the transparency will pop up.  You will click on the small arrow and 
scroll to choose the number of tokens you wish to invest in the group fund. After you 
choose the number you can press submit. 
 
Once everyone has submitted the number of tokens they wish to invest the iPod Touch will 
calculate your earnings and send these values back to you. 
Please copy these values onto your green sheet.  You will repeat this process for several 
rounds.  When you have finished you may set your record sheet down. 
 
Now, how many times will you be asked to make the decisions? Well, we are studying 
situations where the amount of interaction is uncertain. So, all that we can tell you is that 
you will make more than one decision. You may be making quite a few decisions or you 
might be making only a few.  
 
PRACTICE RUN: 
We are going to do a practice run to ensure your comfort with the technology.  You will be 
entering the values which are already typed onto your practice sheet.  Everyone will be 
entering the same values.  You may begin by pressing the TAMU icon.  Now you may 
enter your participant number.  DO NOT CLICK TO BEGIN. 
 
Now that everyone has entered their participant number you may click to begin –  
 
Your green sheet states the # of tokens in the group fund as being 50. 
Please scroll to the 50 to indicate that you wish to invest 50 tokens into the group fund and 
therefore keep 50 tokens in your private fund.   
Then press submit.  Has everyone entered 50? 
Please DO NOT move onto the next period until we have told you to do so. 
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See how the values correspond with your sheet?  These are the values you will be asked to 
write on your sheet when they are not provided for you. 
 
Now, please scroll to the 70 to indicate that you wish to invest 70 tokens into the group 
fund and therefore keep 30 tokens in your private fund. 
Now press submit.  Can everyone see their earnings for this round? 
So the $2.00 from the previous round and the $2.50 from this round add up to equal $4.50. 
 
This is the last practice entry before you will choose how much you choose to invest, after 
you enter your value and press submit, place your iPod touch on the desk. 
Please school to the 30 to indicate that you wish to invest 30 tokens into the group fund 
and therefore keep 70 tokens in your private fund. 
Now press submit.  Can everyone see their earnings for this round? 
So we now add the $1.60 from this round to the $4.50 from the previous two rounds to 
equal $6.10. 
 
Please set your iPod touches down. 
Are there any questions?   
 
Summary 
We will begin the study in a moment. 
You are working in groups of 4.  Some of the people you are working with may be in this 
room or they may be in another room. 
I will announce each period. 
 
You can invest tokens in a group fund in which every group member receives an equal 
share. Each token in this fund is multiplied by 3 and then divided by 4 to determine 
individual shares.  
 
You can keep tokens in your private fund in which each token is worth 1 cent and is only 
yours. 
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You can mix your tokens in any way you wish. 
You will have more than one decision. 
Let‘s begin. This is Decision 1.  
 
Please write down on your sheet how many, if any, tokens you want to take from your 
Private Fund and put it in the space where it says Group Fund.  After you have done 
this, enter your decision on your iPod touch. After everyone in your group has responded, 
you will then be able to see the sum of what other group members have invested in the 
group fund and your earnings.  
 
Are there any questions? 
If you should have any questions about the iPod touch, please raise your hand and one of 
the researchers can help. 
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APPENDIX F 
 
RECORD SHEET 
 
Record Sheet 
 
First name  
Participant #  
You are one member of a group of 4 people 
Period 
# Tokens I 
keep in the 
Private 
Fund 
# Tokens I 
invest in the 
Group Fund 
My Group 
fund 
Earnings 
My Total Earnings 
for this period 
 Total 
  Practice          50          50                            $1.50      $2.00      $2.00 
  Practice          30          70        $2.10      $2.40      $4.40 
  Practice          70          30        $0,90      $1.60      $6.00 
  1       
  2       
  3       
  4       
  5       
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Participant 
# 
 
You are one member of a group of 4 people 
Period 
# Tokens I 
keep in the 
Private Fund 
# Tokens I 
invest in the 
Group Fund 
My Group 
fund 
Earnings 
My Total Earnings 
for this period 
 Total 
  6       
  7       
  8       
  9       
  10       
  11       
 12       
 13       
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You are one member of a group of 4 people 
Period 
# Tokens I keep 
in the Private 
Fund 
# Tokens I 
invest in the 
Group Fund 
My Group 
fund 
Earnings 
My Total Earnings 
for this period 
 Total 
   14       
   15       
   16       
   17       
   18       
   19       
   20       
   21       
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You are one member of a group of 4 people 
 
Period 
# Tokens I keep 
in the Private 
Fund 
# Tokens I 
invest in the 
Group Fund 
My Group 
fund 
Earnings 
My Total Earnings 
for this period 
 Total 
   22       
   23       
   24       
   25       
   26       
   27       
   28       
   29       
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APPENDIX G 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
These questions are referring to the task which you just completed.  When the question 
asks about the group, it is referring to the group which you were working with through the 
I touch. Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability. Please take care 
in considering your answers to each question.  Please circle the numbered response that 
best matches your opinion. 
1. For each of the following, please rate from -5 to 5 how you would best describe your 
group‘s behavior. 
A. Very Unhelpful                         Neutral                                 Very Helpful 
      -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2           3        4     5 
 
B. Very Uncooperative            Neutral                       Very Cooperative 
-5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2           3        4     5 
 
 C. Very Self Oriented             Neutral                  Very Team Oriented 
  -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
 D. Very Unsupportive            Neutral                       Very Supportive 
  -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
2.  For each of the following, please rate from -5 to 5 how you would best describe your 
feelings about the exchanges during the experiment.   
  
 A. Very Displeased              Neutral       Very Pleased 
  -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
 B. Very Unsatisfied              Neutral        Very Satisfied 
  -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
 C. Very Not Joyful              Neutral        Very Joyful 
  -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
 D. Very Bored              Neutral       Very Excited 
  -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
 E. Very Unmotivated              Neutral       Very Motivated 
  -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
 F. Very Unhappy       Neutral                  Very Happy 
  -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
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 G. Very Discontented              Neutral       Very Contented 
  -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
H. Very Unenthusiastic             Neutral        Very Enthusiastic 
  -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
I. Very Tired              Neutral         Very Energetic 
  -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
 J. Very Not Interested              Neutral         Very Interested 
  -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
 
3. For each of the following, please rate from -5 to 5 how you would best describe the final 
outcome of your group‘s efforts. 
 
A. Very Unsuccessful             Neutral           Very Successful 
   -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
 B. Very Unproductive                Neutral            Very Productive 
   -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
 C. Very Not Rewarding                     Neutral                           Very Rewarding 
   -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
 D. Very Uncooperative                    Neutral          Very Cooperative 
   -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
4.  For the following, please use the scale ranging from -5 to 5 to best answer each 
question. 
        
       A. How important is belonging to this group?  
None              Little                 Neutral          Some                  A lot 
   -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
B. How much does the outcome of the game matter to you?  
None              Little                Neutral          Some                  A lot 
  -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
C. How close do you feel to group members?  
 None              Little              Neutral          Some                  A lot 
 -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2       3      4      5 
 
D. How closely do you identify with group members?  
None              Little                Neutral          Some                  A lot 
  -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2      3     4      5 
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E. How much did you trust the members in your group? 
None              Little                Neutral          Some                  A lot 
  -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2      3      4      5 
 
F. In your opinion, how much do you share in common with the group?  
None              Little               Neutral          Some                  A lot 
 -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4      5 
 
G. How common are your goals to those of the group?  
None              Little                 Neutral           Some                  A lot 
  -5     -4      -3      -2        -1           0          1      2        3        4     5 
 
5. A list of statements follow, please indicate the choice that best represents your opinion 
about the statement. 
A. In the future, I would be willing to work with my group again. 
 
A) Strongly Agree   B) Agree  C) Neutral D) Disagree E) Strongly Disagree 
 
B. In the future, I would choose to work with another group before working with the 
same group I worked with today. 
 
A) Strongly Agree   B) Agree  C) Neutral D) Disagree E) Strongly Disagree 
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